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On 20 March 2021, Turkey withdrew from the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul 
Convention’) with a presidential decree. President Erdoğan’s decision and the way in which 
it was carried out has led to great discontent both within the country and on the international 
scenario. The main aim of this analysis is to explore the meaning, impact and aftermath of 
the Turkish government’s decision. The article is divided into two parts: the first part 
analyses the scope and purposes of the Istanbul Convention, and the second part explores 
Turkey’s increasing authoritarianism over the last decade, which offers the framework to 
interpret its decision to withdraw. 
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1. Introduction  
  
«The Republic of Turkey withdraws from the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (CETS 
No. 210) done at Istanbul on 11 May 2011, pursuant to Article 80 thereof»1. 
This declaration, contained in a verbal note from the Permanent Representation 
of Turkey to the Council of Europe, registered at the Secretariat General on 22 
March 2021, formalised Turkey’s decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence, known as the ‘Istanbul Convention’2. Turkey was the first country to sign 
the Convention in 2011 and subsequently to ratify it on 12 March 2012. Ten years 
later, the decision to withdraw came through a decree, signed by President Erdoğan 
on 20 March 2021, without any parliamentary debate3. President Erdoğan’s 
decision and the way in which it was carried out led to great discontent both within 
the country and abroad.  
In Turkey, the decision sparked the immediate reaction of civil society: 
thousands of women took to the streets in defence of the Convention, expressing 
their growing dissent towards the President and his party4. Women’s rights activists, 
lawyers and opposition politicians denounced Erdoğan’s decree, insisting that 
Turkey cannot legally be taken out of an international convention ratified by 
Parliament with a Presidential decree5.  
There were also negative reactions in Europe and on the international scenario. 
The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, said: «We cannot but regret deeply and express 
incomprehension towards the decision of the Turkish government to withdraw from 
this Convention […]. This decision risks compromising the protection and 
fundamental rights of women and girls in Turkey [...]. We therefore cannot but urge 
Turkey to reverse its decision»6. Council of Europe leaders reacted to Turkey’s 
announcement with a joint statement: «We thus deeply regret the decision of the 
President of Turkey to withdraw from this Convention widely supported in the 
                                                 
1 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/210/declarations.  
2 On 20 March 2021, Turkey unilaterally withdrew from the Istanbul Convention. Article 80 of the 
Istanbul Convention permits any party to denounce it by notifying the Council of Europe. 
https://www.coe.int/it/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210.  
3 The Turkish President’s decision concerning Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention 
that was taken on the basis of the Presidential Decree No. 9 was published in the Official Gazette 
on 20 March 2021. 
4 E. Yalcinalp, Turkey Erdogan: Women Rise Up Over Withdrawal from Istanbul Convention, BBC 
Turkish, Istanbul, 26 March 2021.  
5 N. Semercioglu, Turkey’s Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, in Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 22 
April 2021, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2021/04/turkeys-withdrawal-from-the-istanbul-
convention/.  
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country, without any parliamentary debate […]. We therefore call on the Turkish 
authorities not to weaken the international system to protect women against 
violence put in place by the Istanbul Convention»7. Even US President Joe Biden, 
in an official and timely statement, strongly expressed his disappointment: 
«Turkey’s sudden and unwarranted withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention is 
deeply disappointing [...]. This is a disheartening step backward for the international 
movement to end violence against women globally»8. 
The main aim of this article is to analyse the meaning, impact and aftermath of 
the Turkish government’s decision. The analysis is based on the following 
questions: why is the Istanbul Convention so important and what are its main 
purposes? Why did Erdoğan decide to withdraw Turkey from the Convention and 
what path has the country taken in recent years that led to such a change?  
 
2. The Istanbul Convention: scope and purposes 
 
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’) was an important 
development to protect women against violence. It was also significant in the 
development of international law. The Istanbul Convention requires States to 
protect women against violence9. The goals it proposes are broad, ambitious and 
relevant, as defined in art. 1: «a) protect women against all form of violence, and 
prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women and domestic violence; 
b) contribute to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and 
promote substantive equality between women and men, including by empowering 
women; c) design a comprehensive framework, policies and measures for the 
protection of and assistance to all victims of violence against women and domestic 
violence; d) promote international co-operation with a view to eliminating violence 
against women and domestic violence; and e) provide support and assistance to 
organisations and law enforcement agencies to effectively co-operate in order to 
adopt an integrated approach to eliminating violence against women and domestic 
violence»10.  
According to the Convention, violence against women «is understood as a 
violation of human rights and a form of discrimination against women and shall 
mean all acts of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, 
physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering to women» (art. 3). 
                                                 
7 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2449202.  
8 Statement by President Biden on Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/21/statement-by-
president-biden-on-turkeys-withdrawal-from-the-istanbul-convention/.  
9 J. Niemi, L. Peroni, V. Stoyanova, Introduction. The Istanbul Convention as a Vesponse to 
Violence against Women in Europe, in J. Niemi, L. Peroni, V. Stoyanova (eds.), International Law 
and Violence against Women. Europe and the Istanbul Convention, Routledge, London and New 
York, 2020, p. 1. The Convention was adopted by the Committee of Ministers and opened for 
signature in Istanbul on 11 May 2011; it entered into force on the 1st of August 2014. 
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The specific forms of violence mentioned in the Convention are the following: 
physical and psychological violence, coercion and arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
sexual violence and harassment, stalking, forced marriages, female genital 
mutilation, abortion and forced sterilisation, and sexual crimes committed in the 
name of so-called ‘honour’ (artt. 33-42)11. Furthermore, it is established that the 
implementation of the Convention by the contracting parties «shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, gender, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, state of 
health, disability, marital status, migrant or refugee status, or other status» (art. 4 
point 3). 
The Convention offers guidance to States and their respective national 
authorities to give an adequate multidisciplinary response to violence through the 
four pillars (four Ps): prevention of violence, protection of survivors and reparation, 
prosecution of perpetrators, and integrated and co-ordinated policies12. These four 
Ps constitute the structure of the Convention itself, its meaning and its aims13.  
Finally, as an international instrument, the Convention promotes and provides a 
legal basis for international cooperation in the protection of victims, in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes covered by the Convention and in the 
enforcement of judgments (art. 62)14. The Convention also establishes a specific 
monitoring mechanism (‘GREVIO’) in order to ensure effective implementation of 
its provisions by the parties (artt. 66-68). 
The Istanbul Convention has already had a remarkable impact in Europe, which 
is supported by the implementation and monitoring system of the Convention15. Yet 
a decade after its birth, the Convention was overwhelmed by disinformation 
campaigns and unexpectedly became a battleground between progressive and 
conservative forces16. Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, the Convention 
has received strong political resistance; it has been seen as a threat to traditional 
family structure and ‘family values’ and has become the target of nationalist, 
conservative and populist rhetoric17. 
Turkey also fits into this scenario. The Turkish government, despite initial 
enthusiasm, expressed growing opposition to the provisions of the Convention over 





14 J. Niemi, L. Peroni, V. Stoyanova, Introduction. The Istanbul Convention as a Vesponse to 
Violence against Women in Europe, cit,. pp. 8-10. 
15 Idem, p. 11. 
16 https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/04/30/istanbul-convention-framework-crisis.  
17 M. de La Baume, How the Istanbul Convention Became A Symbol of Europe’s Cultural Wars. The 
Effort to Reduce Violence Against Women, Once Relatively Uncontroversial, Has Become A Proxy 
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the last few years, and finally reached the recent decision to withdraw. Turkey will 
officially exit the Convention on the 1st of July 2021. 
 
3. Turkey: from signature to withdrawal (2011-2021) 
 
In order to understand Turkey’s decision to withdraw, we need to reconstruct the 
path of increasing authoritarianism that it has taken over the last decade.  
In 2011, President Erdoğan presented Turkey’s participation in the Istanbul 
Convention as proof of the government’s attention to the defence of women and 
human rights. Until then, the Turkish government, led by the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi  ̧AKP) since 2002, had aspired to 
present itself as a ‘model’ of compatibility between Islam, democracy, and 
secularisation, in a period of significant economic growth and rising ‘soft power’ 
potential in foreign policy18. This was the framework that allowed Erdoğan's 
government to sign the Istanbul Convention.  
However, shortly thereafter, some important changes began to take place, both 
in internal and external relations. The AKP’s third electoral victory made the party’s 
leadership even more ‘self-confident’, not least because it further increased the 
concentration of political power in AKP’s hands. The party exercised tight control 
over the economy, the civil service, the judiciary and the media. Meanwhile, the 
party’s interest in completing the process of internal democratisation diminished.  
At the same time, some events were destined to have a strong impact on the 
Turkish government. The so-called ‘Arab Springs’ created new challenges for 
Turkey’s emerging soft power potential. Turkey’s excessive involvement in the 
internal dynamics of countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East, along with its 
inability to play the role of a reliable regional mediator, weakened Turkey’s ability 
to present itself as a ‘model’ of Islamic-democratic compatibility19.  
On the domestic front, the events of Gezi Park, and the protest movement of 
Taksim Square in 2013 were the most visible signs of growing dissatisfaction 
within the country. The repressive behaviour of the Turkish police, along with 
Erdoğan’s growing authoritarianism, fuelled discontent within Turkish civil 
society, which unsuccessfully sought pluralism and democracy, respect for 
minorities, individual freedom, the preservation of public spaces, freedom of press 
and speech, and non-interference in the religious choices of citizens20.  
From that moment on, Erdoğan defined and consolidated his own authoritarian 
path. On 10 August 2014, Erdoğan, who had previously been the Prime Minister of 
the Turkish Republic, won the Presidential elections with the aim of replacing 
                                                 
18 C. Cerami, Rethinking Turkey’s Soft Power in the Arab World: Islam, Secularism, and 
Democracy, in Journal of Levantine Studies (JLS), Vol. 3 No. 2, 2013. 
19 Z. Öniş, Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest, in Insight Turkey, Vol. 14 
No. 3, 2012. 
20 C. Cerami, Il movimento di protesta turco e la “battaglia delle idee”: cittadinanza, spazi pubblici 
e democrazia, in B. Airò, M. Zaccaria (a cura di), I confini della cittadinanza nel nuovo Medio 
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parliamentary democracy with a presidential system. Turkey moved towards a form 
of ‘illiberal democracy’, in which, although the formal institutions of democracy 
existed, they were led by a majority (whose constituent element is religious 
conservatism) that monopolised power21. The 2016 coup attempt and the purge that 
followed allowed Erdoğan to take greater control of the armed forces, the economy, 
the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the media. The constitutional referendum in 2017 
and the presidential elections in 2018 brought a new system of power to Turkey: 
the Head of State acquired almost unlimited powers and the office of prime minister 
was eliminated. Erdoğan also forged an electoral alliance with the ultra-nationalist 
far-right MHP party. Meanwhile, faced with a growing economic crisis and a 
gradually more aggressive foreign policy, he defined an increasingly authoritarian, 
Islamist and conservative agenda.  
This is the scenario that led to a series of criticisms of the Istanbul Convention, 
and that resulted in the decision to withdraw from the treaty. Women’s rights have 
become the latest battleground in Erdoğan’s war to obtain the support of the more 
conservative electorate22. Islamic and conservative religious groups are close to 
President Erdoğan and necessary in difficult times. The government defends its 
position by arguing that the Convention had become a divisive element within 
Turkish society. The text is accused of questioning the values of the ‘traditional’ 
family and of promoting LGTB culture, in reference to a semantic controversy 
linked to the concept of ‘gender’.  
On 22March 2021, Turkey’s Communication Directorate published a statement 
providing the ‘official’ reasons for withdrawal:  
 
The Istanbul Convention, originally intended to promote women’s rights, was 
hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality – which is 
incompatible with Turkey’s social and family values. Hence the decision to 
withdraw. Turkey is not the only country who has serious concerns about the 
Istanbul Convention. Six members of the European Union (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) did not ratify the Istanbul Convention. 
Poland has taken steps to withdraw from the Convention, citing an attempt by the 
LGBT community to impose their ideas about gender on the entire society23.  
 
The ‘official’ motivation offered by the Turkish government has opened up a 
further field of controversy, attracting not only the protests of women and women’s 
movements but also those of the entire LGBT community and a growing segment 
                                                 
21 Z. Öniş, Monopolizing the Centre: The AKP and the Uncertain Path of Turkish Democracy, in 
International Spectator, Vol. 50 No. 2, 2015. 
22 L. Boulton, Erdogan Sacrifices Women’s Protection in Appeal to Conservatives. Turkey’s 
President Seeks to Boost His Power as The Economy Suffers Under His Mismanagement, in 







Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/2021 ISSN 2612-6672 | DOI 10.13130/2612-6672/15644 | 193  
 
of Turkish civil society24. President Erdoğan decided to ride the wave of the 
unprecedented campaign against the ratification of the Istanbul Convention on the 
basis of the so-called ‘war of gender’, used by right-wing and religious 
fundamentalists, and conservative groups25. Yet this motivation seems to be 
misplaced in the light of the Convention text26. The Istanbul Convention is the 
Council of Europe’s key international treaty to combat violence against women and 
domestic violence and has served as a model to protect women more effectively, 
increase funding to support victims, and create help lines and shelters. Turkey’s 
withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and its justification for doing so have the 
potential to strengthen the disinformation campaign in Central and Eastern 
Europe27. Erdoğan therefore fits into this political debate, fuelling the controversy 
and using women’s rights as a ‘bargaining chip’ to gain support from the more 
conservative electorate, in a moment of political, economic, and social difficulties.  
The year 2023 will mark the centenary of the Turkish Republic and a double 
date: the presidential and legislative elections that Erdoğan cannot afford to lose. 
He will use all his cards to strengthen his conservative electorate. Meanwhile, 
femicide and domestic violence in Turkey are at an alarming level. According to 
the World Health Organisation, nearly 40% of women in Turkey experience 
violence at partners’ hands, compared to around 25% in Europe28. The 2021 data, 
marred by the COVID-19 pandemic, records a further escalation of domestic 
violence against women, due to movement restrictions, social isolation, and 
economic insecurity29. As writer and women’s rights activist Elif Shafak wrote, by 
withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention, the Turkish government defies rule of 
law, human rights and gender equality, and wages war against women30. 
 
4. Conclusions 
                                                 
24 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/turkey-targeting-of-lgbti-people-to-justify-
quitting-convention-on-combating-violence-against-women-is-dangerous/. 
25 K. Sekowska-Kozlowska, The Istanbul Convention in Poland: between the ‘war on gender’ and 
legal reform, in J. Niemi, L. Peroni, V. Stoyanova (eds.), International Law and Violence against 
Women. Europe and the Istanbul Convention, cit. 
26 According to art. 3 c), gender is defined as «socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and 
attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men». For a legal discussion of 
the issue, see: J. Niemi, A. Verdu Sanmartin, The Concept of Gender and Violence in the Istanbul 
Convention, in J. Niemi, L. Peroni, V. Stoyanova (eds.), International Law and Violence against 
Women. Europe and the Istanbul Convention, cit.; V.R. Scotti, The Debate on the Istanbul 
Convention in Turkey: A Populist Reinterpretation of the Principle of Gender Equality, IACL-AIDC 
Blog, 18 February 2021, https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/gender/2021/2/18/the-debate-on-the-istanbul-
convention-in-turkey-a-populist-reinterpretation-of-the-principle-of-gender-equality. 
27 https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/04/30/istanbul-convention-framework-crisis. 
28 A.J. Yackley, Turkey Withdraws from Treaty Protecting Women Against Violence. Erdoğan Issues 
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During the plenary session of the European Parliament, which opened on 26 
April, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen commented 
on the meeting between the EU and Turkey held on 6 April (dominated by the 
controversy that arose following the sofa-gate)31. Von der Leyen's speech was an 
opportunity to talk about the importance of the Istanbul Convention (‘a ground-
breaking legal text and an inspiring document’), and the revival of the values of 
equality and gender equality.  
As also recalled by von der Leyen herself, ten years after the birth of this 
important treaty, even in Europe some countries have not yet ratified the 
Convention, as well as the EU itself as a whole:  
 
I used the meeting in Ankara to reiterate my deep concerns about Turkey 
withdrawing from the Convention. The withdrawal of one of the founding members 
of the Council of Europe is a terrible signal. To be credible, however, we must not 
only criticise others. To be credible, we also have to act at home […]. Several EU 
Member States have still not ratified the Convention. And others are thinking about 
quitting. This is not acceptable. Violence against women and children is a crime. We 
must call it a crime and it must be punished as such. This is why I want the EU itself 
to join the Istanbul Convention. This remains a priority for my Commission32. 
 
For the European Union, defending women’s rights and fighting violence in all 
its forms is a battle of civilisation, which does ‘not only concern the status of 
women, but the status of democracy’33 and the most authentic essence of European 
values, in search of a form of interaction that is participatory, inclusive, and oriented 
towards the aspiration of an ‘open society’. A society in which everyone – 
regardless of race, nationality, gender, or sexual orientation – can enjoy the benefits 
of freedom. 
Erdoğan’s choice has added a further element of confrontation with and distrust 
of Europe. However, the battle of Turkish women is also a European battle, in 
which the role and participation of civil society is crucial. Civil society groups 
remain an important component of democratic resilience and the EU should support 
prodemocracy movements in the face of authoritarianism.  
In recent years, the EU has focused on maintaining interest-based relations with 
Turkey, centred on migration, the economy, and foreign and security policy. 
However, a sustainable positive agenda should include not only interest-driven 
issues, but also rule-based relationships and societal dimensions that consider the 
                                                 
31 ‘Sofa-gate’ is the diplomatic incident that relegated the President of the Commission Ursula von 
der Leyen to the sofa, while the President of the European Council Charles Michel took a seat next 
to the Turkish leader Erdoğan. See: A.J. Yackley, M. Peel, EU-Turkey in Blame Game Over ‘Sofa 
Gate’ After Ursula Von Der Leyen Left Standing. Dispute Over Protocol Prompts Charges of Sexism 
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multiplicity of political and social actors34. The EU’s failure to express a clear 
policy of condemnation of Turkish authoritarianism strengthens the assertiveness 
of Turkey. Above all, the ambiguous European attitude ignores an important 
segment of Turkish civil society that claims European support and determination in 
condemning Turkey’s authoritarianism. The EU shouldn’t limit itself to a 
‘realpolitik’ policy towards Turkey, ignoring European founding values and its own 
democratic, inclusive and pluralist nature. 
 
                                                 
34 N. Arısan-Eralp, S. Aydın-Düzgit, A. Eralp, E. Fuat Keyman, Ç. Nas, Turkey-EU Relations Before 
the March Summit: The Way Forward?, in IPC Policy Brief, March 2021, p. 4, 
https://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Images/CKeditorImages/20210323-23035184.pdf.  
